(Resumen) En vista de la importancia que se concede en muchas versiones del conflicto hispamo-americano de 1898 al papel de la opinión pública, este artículo analiza las divergencias interpretativas en la reciente historiografía española en torno a las relaciones entre opinión pública, prensa y la toma de decisiones políticas conducentes a la guerra, al objeto de reflexionar sobre el ejercicio del poder político y la atribución de responsabilidades históricas.
inaug;urated in January of 1898, for maliciously reporting the affair of Spanish embassador Dupu/s indiscrete private letter (which contained unflattering remarles about McKinley), and for accusing Spain of sinking the Maine. ^
The Dupuy letter scandal, in early February, is seen by many as plainly manifesting Hearst's bad faith and the McKinley administration's exploitation of this type of journalism, not just because of the questionable methods and timing, but, more pointedly, because the principie of freedom of expression in private correspondence was defended only by the diplomatic corps in Washington, and not by American journalists themselves or by any official spokesman from the White House. *
The definitive example of the cióse relationship between sensationalist journalism, popular belligerency, and political decisions must still be the reactions to the sinking of the Maine. Whether the press reflected or whipped up popular pressure in favour of a war with Spain, and both pushed the government along that path, or whether the government exploited smd encouraged the various manifestations of popular bellicosity in order to justify the final decisión to intervene in Cuba, (Serrano, 1984, 31-32) practically all versions of the crisis coincide in that events after the explosión of the American warship led inexorably to war, and an aura of inevitability floats over the vast majority of narrations. ^ Not all American newspapers ran sensationalist and belligerent articles merely to increase their sales, (Bolado, 1991, 51) but even Midwestern papers predisposed American public opinión towards American intervention and war with Spain, by dedicating a lot of attention to the Cuban conflict, by favouring Cuban rebel propaganda, by insistently repeating and linking humamitarian and social Darwinist ideas with the Monroe Doctrine, Manifest Destiny, and Anglo-Saxonism, by harping on American economic and strategic interests in the Caribbean, and in general by offering an unfavourable image of Spain. ^ In general, the American press is deemed to have helped to créate ampie public support for a policy of imperialist expansión. However, the relation between press and pubüc opinión remains unclear. It is recognized that the United States had gradually 5. Bermeosolo, 1962,226-33; Alonso, 1983,132; Serrano, 1984,31-3; Sevilla, 1986, 481; Morales Padrón, 1987, 125-6; Companys, 1987, 468-71; 1988, 330-6, and 1989, 2-4, 20, 37-42, 139-40; Calleja, 1990, 164; Allende, 1990, 68; Bolado, 1991, 49-53, 107, 114-8; Navarro, 1992 , 368. 6. Serrano, 1984 Companys, 1987, 467-74, and 1989, 3-4; Bolado, 1991, 106-10. 7 . In this view, Spanish authors agree with the interpretation dominant in American historiography. Pérez, 1989, 295-302, 317 . American press coverage of this incident is considered to have been highly irresponsible by Bermeosolo, 1962, 228-30; Sevilla, 1986, 485; Companys, 1989, 4, 20,37-42; Calleja, 1990,171-3; Bolado, 1991,118; Navarro, 1992 , 368. 8. González López-Briones, 1990 , makes these points in her analysis of six Indiana newspapers.
been developing economic and strategic interests in the Caribbean and the Pacific since the end of the War of Secession (if not long before that), and that political and ideological factors meant that these interests had become more intense smce the mid-eighties. This does not mean, however, that there was any strong popular support for expansionism, and here historiographical interpretations vary. Some authors contend that there was, indeed, such support in the 1890s,' but others, by contrast, hold that the American people were to a large extent deceived and mobilized by the "yellow" press.'" Faced with the outbresik of the Cuban war of independence in 1895, a simple view seems to suggest that American press and/or public opinión were ahnost entirely sympathetic to the Cuban rebels and to the idea of American intervention from the start" .
A more careful approach reveáis, however, that in the early stages of the Cuban war, American public opinión was divided. Inevitably many sympathized with the Cuban struggle for independence, associating it with the Angloamerican rebellion of 1776, but more conservative sectors frowned upon the wholescale destruction of prívate property by the rebels, they disliked what they saw as a predominantly Negro rebellion reminiscent of the Haitian revolution, and they doubted that Cuban revolutionary leaders would be able to establish a stable government. (Navarro, 1992, 368) Nonetheless, little mention is made of the existence of any antiimperialist or antiinterventionist opinión in the United States. '^ On the whole, then, the American people are far too simplistically portrayed in many Spanish versions as being ignorant about other cultures and nations, as being naive, uncritical and credulous, and as being unable or unwilling to distinguish or condemn journalistic frauds, even when blatant lies were occasionally denounced by a rival newspaper. '^ However, this unsubstantiated view of American public opinión is not a failing exclusive to Spanish historiography. In many American versions "the onset of the wju-is portrayed as a function of an aroused pubhc opinión, which, as commonly acknowledged, need not be rational, and therefore need not be explained." (Pérez, 1989, 300) Equally problematic is the foUow-up notion that this press campaign and/or pubUc opinión effectively influenced Congress and the McKinley administration in their perception and handiing of the crisis and American policy. Many authors see McKinley as a weak and indecisive politician, easily swayed (to the point of being driven to war agadnst his wish, in some versions) by the press and public opinión. " This view is analogous to the interpretations that stress large-scale, long-term developments in economic structures, as factors determining American imperialism in the 1890s, in that either way, the role of presidential leadership is diminished. "
Others, by contrast, envisage McKinle/s administration as simply disguising their true determination to intervene in Cuba. '* The relationship between presidential actions and the press, in this assessment, varies from suggestions that the government simply foUowed their own premeditated policy plans, and took advantage of sensationalist and Jingoistic journalism when it coincided with their own views, " to affirmations that the McKinley team not only were not influenced in their policy plans by public opinión, but, in fact, were largely responsible themselves for the growing popular bellicosity in the United States. '* Similarly, a great deal of attention has been paid to the relationship between public opinión and political decisions in Spain in 1898. Few would doubt the importance of the rising tide of nationalist and imperialist modes of thought in the case of the United States, but a relevant question arises concerning the degree to which the imperialist discourse of the late nineteenth century penetrated in Spanish opinión.
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The general perception that American interference m the Cuban war, and overall conduct throughout the crisis, were immoral and profoundly offensive to Spanish national honour found expression in the generalized depiction of the United States as a pig in Spanish newspapers and in diverse popular protests, ^ and at the same time provoked many popular demonstrations in towns throughout Spain, often fervently patriotic and anti-Yankee, sometimes violent. *' It is even affirmed that the Spanish patriotic response to imminent war agiiinst the United States in 1898 was almost unanimous, (the socialists, foUowers of Pi y Margidl and the Stock Exchange being the few exceptions). (Robles, 1986, 281, and 1991, 110) A different interpretation, however, is that the popular classes were deeply frustrated and demoralized by the long Cuban wars. Discontent with the social injustice of the recruitment system, the high death rate resulting not only (or even primarily) from military actions, but from lack of food supplies, tropical diseases, and deñcient sanitary and medical attention, had undermined popular interest in conserving Cuba. Against this background of disillusionment and suffering, popular patriotic demonstrations were encouraged by the government in 1895, whereas later agitation was impulsed by the republican opposition, leading to questions concerning the evolution of popular opinión throughout the crisis. (Serrano, 1984, 90-7) Mothers of new recruits for Cuba demonstrated their sorrow and protest in several Spanish towns, and it eventually became politically advisable to forbid the families of departing recruits to accompany them on train stations and docks. (Fernández Muñiz, 1988, 557) Finally, the number of men called to military service in Cuba that obtained exemption through fraudulent means, or that went missing or quickly deserted increased between 1895 and 1898, offering another angle on popular opinión about the war. (Serrimo, 1982 (Serrimo, , 253-78, £uid 1984 In this view, by early 1897 many in Spain were apparently resigned to the idea that defeat by the American colossus, though painful, would at least be honourable, and would definitively end the Cuban war. ^ The idea that large sectors of Spanish society, in fact, wanted peace at any price, but did not manifest this opinión because they did not want to appear antipatriotic, has been put forward by several authors. ^ 19. Hernández Sandoica, 1982, 616-8, 643-4; Alonso, 1983, 130; Elorza, 1988, 353-5; Núñez, 1989, 232; Schulze, 1989, 271-2, 280; Elizalde, 1992 , 53-4. 20. Elorza, 1988 Bolado, 1991 , 166-7, 187, 193. 21. Serrano, 1981 , 439-50, and 1984 Elorza, 1988 , 355. 22. Elorza, 1988 , 327, 360, 366, 374, 386. 23. Serrano, 1984 Andrés, 1985, 20; SeviUa, 1986, 491-2; Lasa, 1991, 130-1; Bolado, 1991, 93-4. The niceties of analyzing popular opinión are well illustrated by the violent demonstrations which took place in Málaga in response to McKinle/s message to Congress of llth April. Initially characterized as a burst of student and urban, middle class patriotic protest directed against the American Consulate, the mob soon took on a very different meaning, when popular elements began to assault property and symbols of the established social and political order in Spain itself. In this process, the patriotic and anti-Yankee message faded considerabiy. (Arcas, 1989, 289-92) On the other hand, it is interestmg to see that Catalonian and Basque businessmen supported the poUcies of pacification and retention of Cuba with a view to protecting their commercial privileges in the island, while Catalonian and Basque regionídists opposed both the Cuban and the American war, perceived as further expression of central government oppression of their respective nationalities. " This divergence between the propertied élites and the popular classes of the peripheral regions of Spain also emerges in the Andalusian town of Malaga. (Arcas, 1989, 283-9) Indeed, it is becoming increasingly evident and significant that the Spanish press in 1898 was a means of expression not solely of the predominant ideology of colonialist nationalism (characterized by patriotic exaltation, equally belligerent regarding Cuban independence and American intervention), but also of the profound social tensión which converted the colonial conflict into a general crisis in which the very essence of Spanish nationalism was questioned. ^ Nevertheless, the Spanish press and public opinión are often deemed to have exerted great pressure on the government in 1898, severely limiting the range of acceptable political options. Most Spanish authors stress the fact that the Spanish press vehemently condemned American aid to the Cuban rebels, and on the eve of the war of 1898 became overwhelmingly patriotic, irrational, derisive of American military power, and irresponsibly optimistic about the victorious outcome of an armed conflict with the United States. ^ In the domestic context of Spanish political rivalries, American interference concerning Spain's handling of the Cuban rebellion induced liberal opposition newspapers to accuse the Cánovas government of spinelessly yielding to Yankee pressures, and this naturally led the conservative press to sternly deny any intention of permitting the United States to dictate government measures. Cuba was not considered a colony but an integral part of the Spanish monarchy, and therefore the predominant 24. Elorza, 1988, 328-29, 355; Serrano, 1984, 47-64, 118-27, and 1988, 388-90; Lasa, 1991 , 109-47. 25. Serrano, 1982 , 271-2, and 1988 Fernández Muñiz, 1988 , 554-7. 26. Alonso, 1983 Serrano, 1984, 71-3, 84-85; SeviUa, 1986, 470, 473, 482-3, 487, 490-91, 497, 513-14; Ñíguez, 1987, 88; Elorza, 1988, 354-5, 374, 384; Salas Larrazábal, 1988, 596, 606; Companys, 1989, 96; Cervera, 1990, 151; Rodríguez González, 1990, I, 633, 643, 652; Bordeje, 1990, 153-4; Téllez, 1990, 41-3; Togores, 1990, I, 667; Bolado, 1991, 115-9, 126 , 137, 141, 161; Robles, 1991, 34-119. ideology prohibited not only the sale of the island to the United States, but also the concession of mdependence, at least as long as the rebel army remained in existence. Therefore there was little press support for any practical, conciliatory policies, and as American interference became increasingly difficult to tolérate in the early months of 1898, the great majority of Spanish newspapers whipped themselves up into a frenzy of patriotic, belligerent indignation, leaving the government with very little room for manoevre. "
Spanish military rhetoric was steeped in rigid patriotic belligerency and, together with the Spanish arm/s history of interference in government affairs, represented a serious obstacle to Sagasta's desperate efforts to avoid a y/ai against the United States. ^ Military officers saw the colonies not only as an integral part of Spanish national territory, which they were honour-bound to defend, but also as places in which professional careers could be promoted. ® For their part, the ultra-conservative Carlists were prone to express imperialist belligerency, and clamorously supported general Weyler's actions in Cuba. (Serrano, 1984, 75-9) The Catholic Church and Catholic workers' organizations also played an important role in support of the war, with a view to maintaining the eñsting colonial order and opposing the advance of Protestant and Masonic power. (Serrano, 1984, 48, 64-70 For their part, the left-wing Republicans, with the notable exception of paciñst Pi y Margall, apparently thought that disaster was imminent, and that, if the monarchy coUapsed in the ensuing institutional crisis, they would be better placed to take over the government if they could be seen to have adopted patriotic stances in the face of Cuban insurgency and American intervention. *' The inference from this explanation must be that the part/s interest in the downfall of the government and possibly of the monarchy itself took precedence over the foreseeable material and human costs of a war.
27. Elorza, 1988, 327, 374, 383; Arcas, 1989, 283-4; Bolado, 1991, 61-3; Robles, 1991 , XI. 28. Robles, 1986 , 269-71, and 1991 Serrano, 1988, 389; Companys, 1989, 88-9. 29 . Manuel Espadas Burgos: "Le facteur outre-mer dans la formation du militaire espagnol." Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez. Boccard, Paris, 1978, t. XIV, and Serrano, 1984, 48; Alvarez, 1990, 77; Bordeje, 1990 , 154. 30. Serrano, 1984 Arcas, 1989 , 284. 31. SeviUa, 1986 Serrano, 1984, 79-89, 112-8, and 1988, 388-90; Arcas, 1989, 291; Bolado, 1991, 88. Only El Socialista and El Nuevo Régimen steadfastly expressed pacifist opinions throughout the crisis. In fact, the Spanish Socialist Party garnered considerable political credit in the post-war years for its opposition to the war. Internal divisions plagued the Party at the start of the Cuban rebellion, but by late 1897 Spanish socialists were again iinited and able to conduct a campaign designed to reflect and cultívate popular hostility to the war. '^ Finally, anarchist newspapers, which represented an unstructured minority opinión in Spain, were beset by serious ideological ambivalencies regarding the Cuban war of 1895. On the one hand, Spanish anarchists felt that they should not support a rebellion whose only aim was political independence, because it had no revolutionary content as regards the liberation of the Cuban proletariate. The belligerent patriotism of the ruling classes, whether Spanish or Cuban, held no promise of improvement for the working class. Nevertheless, some anarchists evidently sympathized with the principie of armed rebellion, and gradually carne to express the hope that Cuban separatism would evolve into a fuU-scale social revolution. '^
The press was not alone in the expression of patriotic valúes. Short stories and, in particular, theatre plays and zarzuelas (operettas), written or staged during the crisis, also contained these themes. However, most were penned by second-rate authors and none achieved a massive success, giving rise to at least the suspicion that leading intellectuals and creative authors were reluctant to support the patriotic ideas prevalent in the press, and also that the Spanish public was not overwhelmingly moved by the rhetoric of the stage or the press. ^ Surprisingly, and despite all the accumulated evidence of American expansionist aspirations in the Caribbean and the Pacific, several authors contend that the Spanish government and the Liberal press were slow to become fuUy aware of the threat, not just to Cuba but to Puerto Rico and the Philippines. " One must therefore pose the question of whether these interpretations are in fact taking government declarations and public attitudes at their face valué, without making the obvious critical appraisal that it was in the government's interest not to express its worst fears, in order to guard against the warnings from becoming self-fulfiUing, to avoid giving cause for popular unrest, and also to appear to be in all respects the unsuspecting victim of American greed and bad faith.
When Sagasta finally made the decisión to declare war on the United States on 24th April, it is often explained that the government believed that neither public opinión ñor the military and naval hierarchies would have accepted any other decisión. However, 32. Serrano, 1979 Serrano, , 1984 Serrano, , 99-105, and 1988 Elorza, 1988, 340, 353, 361, 373; Fernández Muñiz, 1988, 557-8; Bolado, 1991, 75-7, 93-4, 120-1, 127, 137-8, 141-2; Robles, 1991 , 92, 113. 33. Núñez, 1991 Serrano, 1984 , 105-12, and 1988 , 390-1. 34. Serrano, 1984 , 490. 35. Sevilla, 1986 Salas Larrazábal, 1988, 608. a darker interpretation raises the suspicion that Sagasta's government only pretended to believe in the belligerent mood of the Spanish people in defense of Cuba, in order to justify the decisión to go to v/ai. This decisión was taken in fact, according to this view, in the conviction that Spsiin would be defeated, solely to save the Liberal Party and perhaps the monarchy from being ousted, either by a military coup or a social revolution.'* Some áuthors even go so far as to suggest that Sagasta was relieved by American intervention because Spain could not win the war against the rebels, and a quick defeat by overwhelmingly superior American forces would afford the government an honourable escape from the Cuban war without putting the throne at risk. '^ The historical problems surrounding Sagasta's decisión to declare war and its justification in the ñame of public opinión by the government itself, by contemporary commentators, and often by historians, give a different meaning, although equally pertinent, to Perez's reflexions on Mclünle/s decisión to wage v/ai against Spain: "Attributed as it is to the will of the people, war serves as a metaphor for triumph of popular democracy. ... elected officials are obliged to acquiesce, perhaps against their better judgment if not against their will", and so, "political leaders are presumed iimocent of willing war and, by implication, absolved of responsibility for war." (Pérez, 1989, 305, 319) Sagasta's and Mclünle/s decisions led to events which had profoundly different consequences for the nations involved, but both chose to absolve themselves of historical responsibility by appearing to bow to popular pressure.
In order to explain the press's insistence on Spanish naval superiority and on the general military incapacity of the United States, on the eve of the war, opinions vary. One theory is that the press deliberately misled the public into thinking that Spain would win an immediate victory. '* Another theory is that the press itself was misinformed about respective Spanish and American navad strengths, and some authors suggest that the increasing complexity of criteria for the classification of war vessels made it difficult to determine with any accuracy real ñghting power. " The inference from this point is that if official Navy reports reflected this difficulty, the press cannot be entirely maligned for misrepresenting Spanish naval strength. However, this can be disputed on the grounds that the Spanish press had consistently dedicated much attention to naval policy and affairs long before 1898, adopting a uniformly critical attitude of government measures, that complete and correct Information was available to the press from the best sources, and that these sources revealed Spanish naval inferiority. *"
The belligerency of the press in 1898 and its incoherency on naval matters, must, then, be put down to some other factor. On the one hand, the inability of journalists to correctly analyze available information might have induced the sincere misconception that Spanish and American naval forces were reasonably balanced, simply because they were so dissimilar that contemporaries had some difficulty in discerning which type of navy would prove to be superior, the large, armoured, slower American battleships, or the smaller, lighter, faster Spanish armed cruisers düad torpedo ships. ^'
On the other hand, misguided patriotism, which could not contémplate surrender without a fight, is also put forward as an explanation why informed peopie might deiiberately misrepresent the known facts. High ranking, politically influential, and well informed naval officers, for example, maintained optimistic views of Spjmish naval power in comparison with American forces, by which attitude they must be held largely responsible for misleading the government, the press, and in the last analysis, public opinión. *^ In conclusión, then, recent trends in works published in Spain show on the one hand a great interest in analyzing a wide range of sources which are presumed to be relevant to the study of public opinión. Newspapers and other publications of different ideological affiliations, creative literature, popular songs, public entertainment, teachings of the Church, opinions or attitudes expressed through popular demonstrations in the Street, meetings and associations, or resistence to military service, have all been examined, though these avenues of enquiry have by no means been exhausted. Private correspondence and personal diaries of the period have not yet been brought to bear with a view to adding nuances to these analyses.
On the other hand, these contributions represent a growng awareness of the complex, many-layered character of public opinión in Spanish society, (though this awareness is strangely lacking when referring to American society), but there is still a tendency to avoid defining the concept of "public opinión", and therefore to deal superficially with the relationship between public opinión and the press. Not enough attention has been paid to questions concerning the extent to which public opinión might be simply reflected in, and/or deiiberately mobilized by, the press, or to the variability even in the short term of popular attitudes.
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It is increasingly evident that, even taking into account the variety of periodical literature, the press does not cover the entire ideological spectrum of Spanish society at the end of the century. PubUc opinión and popular sentiments were not only fragmented, nuanced and variable but, to a large extent, often not fuUy or truly reflected in the press. This argument is of theoretical valué insomuch as it tends to question or even reject the view that public opinión can be held, in the last analysis, responsible for policy decisions of the government. If the conclusión is reached that public opinión was not freely and clearly expressed (by the press or in any other way), its relevance as a factor of historical causation must be greatly reduced, or at the very least carefuUy qualified.
At the same time, ruling élites (and specifically political leaders) and the press (not as spokesman for "the people", but as identifiable representatives of specific interest groups) must be apportioned their fair share of historical responsibility for political decisions, in order to balance the insidious tendency to make public opinión (and by extensión, "the people" in general) diffusely responsible for government decisions and actions which were ideologically dubious and/or caused much unnecessary distress.
